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Abstract 20 
Controlled organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) has recently been revived in the UK, as part 21 
of attempts to increase organ donation rates. The re-introduction of DCD has subsequently become 22 
the focus of bioethical controversy, since it necessitates intervening in the care of dying patients to 23 
obtain quality donor organs. Transplant policy responses to these concerns have generated new legal 24 
and ethical guidelines to address uncertainties around DCD, producing claims that the UK has 25 
overcome’ the ethical challenge of DCD. In contrast, by drawing on Lynch’s call to ‘respecify’ ethics, 26 
this paper argues that ethics in DCD cannot be reduced to abstract directives for practice, but, instead, 27 
are composed and dealt with as an organisational problem. To do this, I utilise data from an 28 
ethnographic study examining the production of the ‘minority ethnic organ donor’ within UK organ 29 
donation settings; in particular, the data pertains to a case hospital which was in the process of 30 
developing a DCD programme during the period of fieldwork. Findings show that the ethics of DCD are 31 
encountered as practical sets of problems, constructed in relation to particular institutional locales. I 32 
describe how these issues are worked-around by creating conditions to make DCD organisationally 33 
possible, and through the animation of standard procedures into acceptable forms of practice. I argue 34 
that ethics in DCD go far beyond normative bioethical principles, to encompass concerns around: the 35 
reputation of hospital Trusts, public perceptions of organ donation, the welfare of potential donor 36 
families, and challenges to the work of health professionals caring for dying patients. The paper 37 
enriches understanding of ethics in science and medicine by showing how ethics are assembled and 38 
negotiated as a practical-organisational concern, and calls for further examination of how DCD gets 39 
constructed as a potential problem and is made to happen in practice. (299 words) 40 
Key Words 41 
United Kingdom; Organ donation; transplantation; death and dying; ethics; ethnography; clinical 42 
guidelines; health professional practice; organisations 43 
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Introduction 44 
In 2008 the UK Organ Donor Taskforce (ODT) introduced a series of recommendations designed to 45 
increase the UK’s historically low rates of organ donation and tackle its large waiting lists for 46 
transplantation. Among the recommendations was the requirement to urgently resolve the 47 
“outstanding legal, ethical and professional issues” around controlled organ donation after circulatory 48 
death (DCD) in order to “ensure that all clinicians are supported and are able to work within a clear 49 
framework of good practice” (Department of Health, 2008: 9). At this time, there was no clear legal 50 
position or standardised protocols for DCD in the UK, and the practice was rare (Gardiner, 2016). 51 
Controlled DCD involves retrieving organs from donors who are declared dead on the basis of cardio-52 
respiratory criteria. Whilst DCD was used in early experiments of transplant medicine in the 1950s and 53 
60s, it became largely obsolete after the establishment of brain death in the 1970s, enabling the 54 
recovery of oxygenated organs from brain dead donors (De Vita, Snyder & Grenvik, 1993). However, 55 
declines in rates of brain death over the last two decades have led to the focus on reviving DCD as a 56 
way of expanding the availability of transplantable organs (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges & UK 57 
Donation Ethics Committee, 2011). Since the 2008 recommendations, the UK’s DCD programme has 58 
rapidly expanded, with DCD donors now constituting 41% of all deceased donors in the UK (NHS Blood 59 
and Transplant, 2017).  60 
Yet, despite its ability to increase rates of donor organs, DCD has long been the subject of ethical 61 
controversy, since it necessitates intervening in the care of dying patients in order to obtain quality 62 
organs for transplantation (e.g. Bell, 2003; Fox, 1993). The resurgence of DCD has subsequently led to 63 
debates in the clinical and bioethics literature regarding the tension between the drive to optimise 64 
the potential for organ donation and the role of medicine at the end-of-life (Bell, 2008; Gardiner & 65 
Riley, 2007; Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010). In response to these concerns, and following the ODT’s 66 
recommendations, the policy response to DCD has rapidly developed, with the production of new 67 
clinical, legal, and ethical guidelines. These policies  attempt to clarify ambiguities relating to DCD and 68 
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act as guides to best practice for health professionals, for example, by outlining how to assess the 69 
‘overall benefit’ of organ donation for a dying patient (e.g. Academy of Medical Royal Colleges & UK 70 
Donation Ethics Committee, 2011; British Transplant Society, 2013; Department of Health, 2009). The 71 
generation of these policies has led the National Deputy Clinical Lead for Organ Donation to claim that 72 
the UK has ‘overcome’ the ethical challenges involved in DCD, positioning the nation as a ‘world-73 
leader’ in the practice (Gardiner, 2016).  74 
 75 
The official discourse around the ethics of DCD therefore gives the impression that the problem of 76 
DCD has been defined, and, in turn, has been resolved through the provision of abstract directives for 77 
the (ethical) practice of DCD. In contrast, in this paper, I draw on Michael Lynch’s (2001, 2013) call to 78 
respecify ethics in order to show how ethics in DCD are not simply universal moral issues, but become 79 
locally composed within specific circumstances, at particular times. Lynch’s respecification draws on 80 
the tradition of ethnomethodology, which seeks to examine how taken-for-granted issues, concepts 81 
and topics, like ethics, can be understood “in-and-as-of-the-workings-of-ordinary-society” (Button, 82 
1991: 6) and are made “locally and practically relevant” (Lynch, 1993: xii). In taking this approach I will 83 
show that ethics in DCD can be understood as practical sets of problems, which get constructed and 84 
resolved within specific healthcare settings. In so doing, this paper engages with social science work 85 
which contextually situates ethical issues in science and medicine (e.g. Brodwin, 2008; Hoeyer & 86 
Jensen, 2012; Smith-Doerr & Vardi, 2015), by highlighting how ethics are assembled as a practical-87 
organisational problem. It also advances an alternative perspective to the clinical and bioethical 88 
debates around DCD, by arguing that we cannot fully understand the ethical conundrum of DCD 89 
without examining the organisational milieu within which DCD is constructed as a potential concern, 90 
and is made to happen in practice.  91 
 92 
To do this, I utilise data from an ethnographic study on the institutional production of the ‘minority 93 
ethnic organ donor’ in the context of UK organ donation practices (Cooper, 2016; Kierans & Cooper, 94 
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2011, 2013). The research was conducted between 2009 and 2011 when UK organ donation services 95 
were undergoing infrastructural change following the ODT’s recommendations. Drawing on exemplars 96 
from a case hospital, which was in the process of developing its own DCD programme during the 97 
period of fieldwork, I describe the particular institutional circumstances in which DCD was both 98 
produced as a potential problem for the hospital and was made practicably workable. Before turning 99 
to the data, I further specify the bioethical and clinical debates around DCD. I then outline the social 100 
science literatures which have dealt with diverse controversies in transplant medicine, before 101 
highlighting bodies of research in the social sciences which take a situated approach to understanding 102 
ethics in science and medicine – an understanding to which this paper contributes.  103 
 104 
DCD and its controversies: situating (ethical) concerns in organ transplantation 105 
As previously commented (Cooper, 2017), the debates around DCD are not uniquely located within 106 
the UK. Arguments over the dilemmas involved in DCD were ignited in 1992 with the introduction in 107 
the US of what became known as the ‘Pittsburgh Protocol for non-heartbeating organ donation’, 108 
which advocated aggressive organ preservation techniques and the removal of organs two minutes 109 
after the donor’s heart stopped. This prompted debate between clinicians and bioethicists about 110 
potential violations of the dead donor rule, given the short time permitted between asystole and the 111 
declaration of death (Arnold & Youngner, 1993). Commenting on the protocol, the anthropologist 112 
Renee Fox (1993: 231) went so far as to label DCD an “ignoble form of cannibalism”, referring to the 113 
“morally questionable” practices it permitted.  114 
In the UK context, death is legally declared in DCD donors 5 minutes after cardio-respiratory arrest, 115 
meaning organ retrieval can begin after this time (Dominguez Gil et al. 2011). While the practice of 116 
DCD in the UK involves, what are considered to be, less aggressive modes of pre-mortem intervention 117 
than in the US, such as adjusting life-sustaining treatments, and altering the timing and location of 118 
withdrawal of care (Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010), it has, nevertheless, become the subject of intense 119 
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scrutiny in UK bioethics literature. Here, debates have focused upon whether DCD violates a broad 120 
interpretation of the dead donor rule (the argument that living patients should not be treated ‘as 121 
though they were dead’ for the purposes of organ donation) and whether potential donors receive 122 
appropriate care at the end-of-life (Bell, 2003; Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010: 17; Gardiner, 2016). In turn, 123 
the policy response to these debates has been rapid. This began with the publication by the 124 
Department of Health in 2009 of Legal Issues Relevant to Non-Heartbeating Organ Donation, which 125 
clarified which interventions were legally permissible in DCD. This was followed by the UK Donation 126 
Ethics Committee’s (UKDEC) An Ethical Framework for Controlled Donation after Circulatory Death 127 
(AMRC/UKDEC, 2011), and updated guidelines from the British Transplant Society for Transplantation 128 
from Donors after Deceased Circulatory Death (2013). All of these policies focus on the importance of 129 
assessing the ‘best’ or ‘overall’ interest of the dying patient; they justify end-of-life interventions to 130 
facilitate DCD when it is understood that the dying patient would have wanted donation and that 131 
further life-sustaining treatment is not of overall benefit (AoMRC/UK DEC, 2011; BTS, 2013). The 132 
policies therefore focus on standardising the ethical-legal frameworks around DCD, as a way of 133 
enabling the renewal of this controversial technology (Bernat, 2008; Cooper, 2017).   134 
However, the prevailing representation of DCD as a bioethical concern which can be mitigated by the 135 
production and implementation of clinical guidelines, means that little is known about how the ethics 136 
of DCD are instantiated within everyday healthcare settings. That there is a gap in this area is 137 
surprising, given the attention which has been paid to the field of organ transplantation and its 138 
associated controversies by social scientists. This work, writ large, has been concerned with issues 139 
regarding how and when organ donation occurs, and how and by whom organs are obtained. It 140 
includes studies of: the controversy over the re-definition of death, with the introduction of brain 141 
death in the 1960s and 70s (Giacomini, 1997; Lock, 2002a); ambiguities around the boundaries 142 
between life and death in the context of the still-breathing brain dead organ donor (Hogle, 1999; Lock, 143 
7 | P a g e  
 
2002b; Sharp, 2006); and the commodification of organs and body parts through the trade and 144 
trafficking of organs (Cohen 2002, Scheper-Hughes, 2000, Yea 2010).  145 
In particular, many scholars have moved away from conceptualising transplant technologies in 146 
relation to sets of abstract, universalised concerns (e.g. issues around bioethics, commodification, 147 
exploitation in relation to organ trafficking etc), and have concentrated on specifying the ways in 148 
which issues in organ transplantation are contextually constructed within national and local settings 149 
(e.g. Cohen, 2002; Columb, 2017; Das, 2000; Hoeyer & Jensen, 2012; Hogle, 1999; Kierans, 2011; Lock, 150 
2002b). Of most relevance here is Veena Das’ (2000) work in India, which examines the global rhetoric 151 
around organ shortages and concomitant bioethical principles of autonomy and rights in relation to 152 
the selling of kidneys by the poor. She critiques these discourses, arguing that: “a vocabulary of rights 153 
simply masks the faces of social suffering – such techniques of survival [selling kidneys] are seen by 154 
the poor not as acts of autonomy but as part of their everyday life in which all kinds of violence has to 155 
be turned into opportunity” (p.284). Das’ work teaches us the importance of directing our 156 
understandings not at the level of abstract ethical principles and universal discourses, but towards the 157 
contexts and “fine texture of life” (Das, 2000: 284) through which subjects get forged and transplant 158 
technologies are (re)articulated within everyday settings.  159 
The focus by Das on the tensions between normative bioethical principles and the everyday lives of 160 
those upon whom these categories are supposed to act, reflects early calls by social scientists to 161 
broaden bioethics beyond the domain of moral philosophy into understandings of the “social 162 
processes of moral life” (Fox, 1976; Hoffmaster, 1992; Kleinman, 1999: 72). Writing in this journal 163 
more than two decades ago, Hoffmaster (1992: 1462) called for examination of the social and practical 164 
dimensions of ethics by investigating the “flexible ways in which human beings actually handle moral 165 
problems”. These ideas have since been developed by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars 166 
who have articulated how knowledge and experience of ethics are co-produced in the interactions 167 
between bioethical frameworks and the daily work and informal discourses of scientific practice 168 
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(Brodwin, 2008; Pickersgill, 2012, see Jasanoff, 2004). In this vein, a growing body of social science 169 
research has demonstrated the diverse ways in which ethical norms are negotiated, transgressed and 170 
transformed within the constraints of institutions and according to the interests of different actors 171 
(Brosnan et al., 2013; Corrigan, 2003; Hedgecoe, 2014; Heimer, 2013; Hoeyer & Tutton, 2005; Hoeyer 172 
& Jensen 2012; Hoeyer, Jensen & Olejaz, 2015).  173 
This work has therefore done much to refocus the normative programme of bioethics and offers a 174 
useful departure point for a situated analysis of the ethics of DCD. In particular, I draw on Lynch’s 175 
suggestion to respecify ethics as ‘ethigraphy’, referring to an examination of the “circumscribed and 176 
circumstantial ways moral agents handle novel conflicts and constitute natural and social orders” 177 
(Lynch, 2001: 3, 2013). In the context of DCD, such an approach can lead us to pose questions, like: 178 
how do (ethical) concerns around DCD emerge and operate in everyday clinical settings? And, how 179 
are such issues discussed and resolved in these settings? It is these questions which this paper is 180 
concerned with addressing, in order to develop a more situated understanding of the ethics of DCD. 181 
Below, I outline the methodology for the broader study from which the data is taken, before turning 182 
to the findings.  183 
Methodology   184 
The data in this paper is drawn from an ethnographic study which aimed to examine the institutional 185 
production of the ‘minority ethnic organ donor’ in the UK, from the perspective of organ donation and 186 
allocation practices (Cooper, 2016; Kierans & Cooper, 2011, 2013). The study was developed in 187 
response to the characterisation, by transplant medicine, of UK Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 188 
populations as a problematic constituency of organ givers, due to their high demand for transplantable 189 
organs and low rates of organ donation, in comparison to their ‘white’ counterparts (Kierans & Cooper, 190 
2011). In contrast to the emphasis by health researchers on the cultural beliefs of BME groups around 191 
organ donation, the project focused on the healthcare settings and institutional processes through 192 
which potential (BME) donors are managed, and organ donation is requested. This approach to the 193 
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problem was informed by work across sociology, anthropology and science and technology studies, 194 
concerned with the contexts and intricacies of scientific and medical practice (e.g. Hogle, 1999; 195 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003).  196 
The study was granted full National Health Service (NHS) ethics approval in June 2009. Ethnographic 197 
fieldwork was conducted between October 2009 and February 2011, and concentrated on: i) the work 198 
of work of two regional English teams of Specialist Nurses in Organ Donation (SN-ODs), who are 199 
responsible for facilitating and managing the organ donation process; and ii) two hospital sites which 200 
these teams served, namely an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and Paediatric ICU in two acute hospital 201 
Trusts. Both hospitals served large minority ethnic patient populations and had relatively low organ 202 
donor rates. The ethnographic fieldwork focused on observing activities and events which would allow 203 
insight into the processes and practices around organ donation, and included observations of: 204 
donation training sessions for health professionals, organ donation committee meetings and regional 205 
SN-OD team meetings, as well as analysing local and national policy documents around organ 206 
donation. Ethical and practical difficulties involved in waiting for someone to die in the ‘right’ way 207 
meant that it was not possible to observe the process of donation as it occurred. To provide detailed 208 
insight into the donation process, twenty-six narrative interviews were conducted with 22 health care 209 
professionals (these included: SN-ODs, ICU nurses, consultant intensivists and anaesthetists) who 210 
were purposively recruited on the basis of them having experience of organ donation, in particular 211 
with ‘BME’ families. Interviews focused on accounts of participants’ experiences and practices around 212 
requesting and managing organ donation. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed 213 
verbatim and observations were written up as fieldnotes. All participants were assigned pseudonyms, 214 
and identifying features of donation cases were anonymised.  215 
 216 
The start of fieldwork coincided with the development in one of the hospital sites (named here as 217 
‘Hillview’) of a new DCD programme. As I describe below, this organisational change was viewed as an 218 
opportunity by Hillview to increase its low rates of organ donors. As a result, much of the fieldwork at 219 
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Hillview eventually focused on the introduction of the DCD programme into the Trust. The research 220 
data (fieldnotes and interview transcripts) was analysed iteratively during the course of the study. The 221 
analytical approach was broadly thematic, looking for commonalities in meaning-making and practices 222 
around organ donation, alongside situating these issues within wider institutional, social and political 223 
contexts, such as the national drive to increase organ donation. Narrative interviews were also 224 
subjected to a structured narrative analysis, to understand how participants constructed their 225 
experiences of managing and requesting organ donation (Reissman, 2008).  226 
In what follows, I first outline how concerns around DCD were constructed as sets of practical issues, 227 
specific to the organisational setting of Hillview. In turn, I describe how these problems were worked 228 
around by creating the conditions to make DCD practically possible for the Trust, and through the 229 
animation of new DCD procedures into acceptable forms of practice for the local setting. It is 230 
important to note that, while the project was focused on understanding organ donation in relation to 231 
ethnicity, the broad ethnographic lens meant that data captured general institutional practices and 232 
processes around organ donation to contextualise the issue (see also Kierans & Cooper, 2013). This 233 
paper is therefore focused on the administrative and organisational struggles documented in relation 234 
to the development of the DCD programme at Hillview, and does not only pertain to DCD in relation 235 
to minority ethnic donors.    236 
Organ donation at Hillview hospital: National problem, localised concerns 237 
The year of my entry into Hillview, at the end of 2009, was a crucial time for the hospital in relation to 238 
organ donation. The creation of the 2008 Organs for Transplant report by the Organ Donor Taskforce 239 
(ODT) had impelled NHS Trusts into action to meet the ODT’s overall aim of making organ donation a 240 
“usual not unusual event” (Department of Health, 2008: 9) at the end-of-life. To make this aim a 241 
reality, the report made a number of recommendations which were to be instituted at the local, 242 
hospital Trust level. These recommendations included: embedding Specialist Nurses in Organ 243 
Donation (SN-ODs) within hospital Trusts, with responsibility for facilitating the changes and managing 244 
11 | P a g e  
 
the organ donation process; appointing a Clinical Lead for organ donation, usually an ICU consultant, 245 
within every Trust to promote organ donation to hospital staff and work alongside the donor nurse; 246 
and introducing minimum notification criteria for organ donation, meaning that all potential donors 247 
should be referred to a SN-OD for assessment. At the time of my fieldwork, the Trust was therefore 248 
undergoing substantial changes in the effort to drive up its rates of organ donation. These changes 249 
were being driven by the Trusts newly embedded SN-OD, Emily, who was tasked with working 250 
alongside John, a Consultant Anaesthetist and Hillview’s Clinical Lead for donation, to make the 251 
necessary adjustments to increase organ donation at Hillview, with an eye to working to a ‘UK-wide 252 
perspective’ (DH, 2008: 6).  253 
As part of this strategy, Emily and John were in the process of developing a new DCD programme at 254 
the Trust. In my interviews and discussions with them, Emily and John guided me to the particular 255 
conditions at Hillview which, in their opinion, made the task of implementing the DCD programme 256 
difficult: namely that the hospital serves a large South-Asian patient population, and had a reputation 257 
of rarely referring potential donors to the specialist donation nurse team. Emily described the way in 258 
which these factors interacted, to make DCD challenging at the hospital in various ways: 259 
Historically, the unit had always had, I think it’s fair to say, a very poor donation rate. And 260 
the fact that there’d been one donor...since 2008 I think speaks for itself. So a number of 261 
problems here: no DCD programme, a large percentage of the local population are from 262 
South Asian community, and [there is a] fairly high refusal rate from this community. 263 
We’d been trying to get a DCD programme in here [Hillview] for the last 6 years, but we 264 
kept on hitting a brick wall with the [ICU] team at the hospital. The Consultants were all 265 
concerned about the legal and ethical things around it [DCD]. They seemed to believe 266 
that if they made a decision about withdrawing treatment then went forward with organ 267 
donation they would have a criminal prosecution against them. So it’s been a long drawn-268 
out thing, but as from a few months ago, we have finally got the DCD programme up and 269 
running. (Emily, SN-OD at Hillview) 270 
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During later discussions with Emily and John, I was party to further uncertainties which were 271 
invoked by DCD at the Trust. John discussed his fears that NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) 272 
were being overly-aggressive in their drive to increase donor rates, and that attempts to clarify 273 
the legal aspects of DCD were not as straightforward as they may seem, explaining that “it’s 274 
(DCD) not like boiling an egg: you don’t know what’s in the patient’s best interests”. Emily also 275 
divulged an incident which had occurred some years previously, when an inexperienced 276 
Intensive Care clinician had tried to, in her words, “push through” a non-heart beating donation 277 
(as DCD was then called) without there being any policies at Hillview for this process. According 278 
to Emily, a number of staff were unhappy with the occurrence: it had, as she put it, “left a bad 279 
taste in peoples’ mouths”: a wariness about the new drive to implement DCD at Hillview.  280 
Here we see the ways in which broader concerns around DCD – such as ethical issues involved 281 
in judging the best interest of a patient, and worries about litigation – interact with the local 282 
specificities of Hillview, as a Trust which was viewed to hold particular problems for the roll-out 283 
of a DCD programme. These issues included: the lack of an existing culture around donation at 284 
Hillview, with an ICU team little-used to managing the process of organ donation; understanding 285 
donation as being more difficult in relation to the particular locale of Hillview, with a South Asian 286 
patient population conceived of as particularly problematic for organ donation; and fears about 287 
the reality of conducting DCD, underpinned by past experiences at the Trust. Whereas national 288 
guidelines highlight abstract ethical and legal aspects of DCD, in relation to assessing the overall 289 
interest of the patient during decisions around end-of-life care and organ donation, in the 290 
context of Hillview, DCD became an emerging matter of concern specific to the locale within 291 
which it was being implemented: in the connection to existing and historical practices, and 292 
patient populations. Ethics, in this context, therefore became constructed and encountered as 293 
a practical set of problems within the organisational setting of Hillview.  294 
However, as I show below, the particular problems encapsulated by Hillview for the roll-out of 295 
DCD were also, conversely, viewed as an opportunity for the Trust. 296 
DCD as opportunity: practically accomplishing DCD at Hillview 297 
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As part of its attempts to overhaul the hospital’s previously poor record on organ donation, 298 
Hillview went public in its campaign to drive up its donor rates. Press releases from the hospital 299 
and local media pieces reported on the new initiative to increase organ donation in the area, 300 
focusing, in particular, on the need to promote donation to the local South Asian community. 301 
These reports highlighted the potential for the initiative to save lives in the region, describing 302 
how the increased number of donors at Hillview since the changes were rolled out had helped 303 
save the lives of a number of people waiting for transplant. What was left out of the reports, 304 
however, were the exact details of what this ‘initiative’ involved: with DCD being a key aspect 305 
of Hillview’s plan to overhaul its organ donation services. 306 
During the course of delivering a training session presentation to ICU nurses about the roll-out 307 
of DCD, Emily highlighted to her audience the fact that there were over 100 people waiting for 308 
a kidney transplant at Hillview, and that nearly 10 people had died while waiting for a kidney in 309 
the previous year. Emily emphasised the potential for DCD to assist in the reduction of these 310 
waiting lists to her audience. This, she told them, is due to the fact that kidneys from DCD donors 311 
are usually offered to local transplant centres, because of the shortened time in which kidneys 312 
can be left outside the body in DCD. While problems in DCD were locally composed, they were 313 
also drawn on as reason for introducing DCD at Hillview. The implementation of DCD was 314 
promoted as an organisational opportunity for Hillview: it would work in the hospital’s favour 315 
by providing the potential to reduce its own transplant waiting lists. Rather than simply being 316 
presented as a broader part of the realisation of the ODT’s national recommendations, the 317 
implementation of DCD was thus represented as way of tackling local problems at Hillview. 318 
A crucial aspect to making the plans for DCD a reality at Hillview was through the coordination 319 
of different people and resources at the hospital. For Emily and John, a large part of this work 320 
involved bringing together and negotiating the interests of different actors who would be 321 
involved in DCD. John explained to me the challenge of this process: 322 
Initially it took right until the beginning of this year to convince the 6 main Intensive 323 
Care consultants to agree to set up this programme, and the feeling was we couldn’t 324 
really set it up without everybody’s agreement. So having got the agreement of the 6 325 
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main Intensivists, we then had to seek support from the rest of the team: all the 326 
nursing staff, both here and theatres, and the Emergency department, and the 327 
consultants in the Emergency department. And we’ve talked to an awful lot of people 328 
in the last six months, and we got to the point where we’d got a fairly good pathway 329 
defined and we’re having to […]make sure that we’re all happy in how it’s set out.  330 
John describes the work involved to make DCD a practical possibility. This involved, in the first 331 
instance, lengthy negotiations to secure the agreement of various staff members, including: Intensive 332 
Care consultants, nursing staff, Emergency Department consultants, and theatre staff. During this 333 
negotiation process, localised concerns about DCD were worked around and re-constructed through 334 
the initiation and alignment of various people at the Trust, who were crucial for the establishment of 335 
the DCD programme. In so doing, the spaces needed to perform DCD (the Emergency Department, 336 
ICU wards, and operating theatres) were also made available. The production of the DCD programme 337 
was therefore not simply a matter of overcoming ethical concerns about the practice itself. In order 338 
to begin to consider the ethical issues involved in DCD, John and Emily had to first create the conditions 339 
to ensure that DCD was a practical possibility, by co-opting diverse bodies of staff and resources into 340 
going forward with the process. 341 
With the support of the ICU, Emergency and Theatre departments at the Hospital, Emily and John 342 
could begin to roll-out the DCD programme. A key element to achieving this was in the generation and 343 
dissemination of a local protocol for DCD, to provide practical certainty to the process (Hogle, 2009). 344 
One year after Emily started working at Hillview, the DCD programme was pre-launched with training 345 
sessions for ICU and Emergency Department staff to introduce them to the new procedures for 346 
conducting DCD at the Trust. These sessions took place during lunch-time slots in Emily’s office, which 347 
also doubled-up as the ICU’s seminar room. During one such session with some of the ICU nurses, 348 
Emily took her audience through the Trusts DCD protocol on PowerPoint slides.  349 
Emily was concerned with emphasising the importance for her audience of developing ownership over 350 
the new procedures around DCD, so that they were able to respond to events as they unfolded in 351 
practice. She talked the nurses through each stage of DCD, encouraging their feedback at each step.  352 
She asked her audience whether they thought a dying patient should be maintained with therapies if 353 
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they had not yet obtained their relative’s agreement for donation. One nurse replied with “I wouldn’t”; 354 
Emily assured her audience of the flexibility of this procedure, by telling them that such decisions 355 
should be made as events play out on the day. One slide, highlighted in bold stated that “consent can 356 
be revoked at any time”, referring to the fact that families can withdraw their consent for donation 357 
right up until the first incision is made in theatre. At this point, the nurses interjected with their 358 
concerns about family members chasing their dead relative through the hospital corridor. One nurse 359 
expressed her more general worry that families would feel under pressure to consent to donate when 360 
their relative is not yet even dead. Emily interjects: “I know what you’re thinking, that’s what I thought 361 
before I did it for the first time, but it’s not like that at all.” A discussion then ensued about the 362 
potential problems involved in transporting someone who is obviously dead to the operating theatre 363 
and how this might look to members of the public. Emily discussed likely tactics: “We’ll have someone 364 
waiting by the lift and to clear the corridors. We may even cover their face with an oxygen mask for 365 
sanity reasons, so that you don’t get people stopping you asking what you’re doing with that patient”.  366 
The introduction of the new DCD programme in training sessions provoked debate and, at times, 367 
criticism from ICU staff regarding possible issues it could raise for potential donor families. At the end 368 
of a training session, one nurse became quite opinionated and, arms folded, expressed her worries 369 
about the implications of a family member giving consent for DCD if they were not aware of their 370 
relative’s wishes around donation. Emily reassured her, firmly asserting that she would advise a family 371 
member against going ahead with donation if they were not comfortable with the idea of it. 372 
Dissatisfied with this answer, the nurse pressed: “I just don’t agree with it (DCD), it sounds like you’re 373 
pushing it on a family. I’ve got a donor card but you get some families who are so distressed, and then 374 
to have a team approaching them about donation is wrong”. In response, Emily calmly told her that 375 
everyone was entitled to their opinion and that it was important to talk about issues like the one the 376 
nurse raised. In a later interview with Emily, I questioned her over this incident. Emily recalled how, 377 
after the session, this particular nurse had approached her with an apology: “she said: ‘I’m really sorry 378 
for behaving like that in there (…) I’m really pro-donation’. I think it’s difficult when you have your own 379 
views and then you see patients and families isn’t it? It’s just that very fine line”. Here, Emily refers to 380 
the tension between health professionals being pro-DCD in theory, but the struggles some may 381 
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experience with carrying this stance into practice, when faced with dying patients and distressed 382 
families.   383 
It was in these training sessions, therefore, that the local concerns of ICU staff, expected to participate 384 
in DCD, began to develop and become visible. These worries were largely orientated around the 385 
practical tasks involved in DCD, and included: 1) Dealing with families: the contingencies of consent: 386 
how to deal with difficult scenarios involving potential donor families, such as the problems involved 387 
in approaching distressed families about DCD;  concerns over whether families might change their 388 
mind on their decision to donate their relative’s organs, and questions about whether invasive 389 
treatments should be maintained in dying patients prior to obtaining consent for donation; 2) The 390 
practical environment of DCD: how to deal with the potential interaction between the public and dead 391 
bodies being transported through the hospital into theatre, usually only reserved for the treatment of 392 
the living. Ethics here are revealed as developing in relation to particular imagined/hypothetical 393 
circumstances, and embedded within specific environments in the hospital (especially spaces where 394 
the general public and deceased donors may come into contact).  395 
These common-sense, situated concerns were, in turn, worked through by Emily, as part of her task 396 
in training staff about the new procedure. This she did using a number of strategies, namely by: 397 
reassuring her audience that the procedures they are learning are flexible: mouldable to donor 398 
scenarios as they are encountered; allaying their concerns using her own experiential knowledge of 399 
the process of DCD; reassuring them about certain practices that would absolutely not occur (such as 400 
pressurising families into consenting); and orienting the nurses to practical solutions for potential 401 
problems, such as how to conceal the dead status of a donor. In so doing, Emily translates the new 402 
procedures around DCD into “locally relevant guides-to-action” (Kierans & Cooper, 2013: 226): as 403 
having the ability to work with, rather than against, the everyday contingencies and concerns involved 404 
in clinical practice. The conceivable (ethical, practical, personal) concerns of staff, responsible for 405 
putting DCD into action, were therefore made tenable by practically orientating them to future 406 
solutions within the organisational setting in which these concerns were composed, and worked 407 
through.   408 
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These intensive preparations for the DCD programme at Hillview were a way of ensuring that 409 
everything was ready to actually do DCD, or, in John’s words: “it was just a matter of going ahead and 410 
making sure that what we’d done [to prepare] was sufficient to get us through the process [of DCD]”. 411 
However, towards the end of my fieldwork, it became apparent that preparations for the (ethical) 412 
practicalities of DCD could never fully encompass the reality of what was involved when a potential 413 
DCD donor came along. By the time the DCD programme had been up and running for a few months 414 
at the end of my fieldwork, the hospital had gone through the process of having two potential DCD 415 
donors. Neither of these had ended up proceeding to donation: one patient did not die in the allotted 416 
two hour time-slot after care was withdrawn (this ~ time period between withdrawal of care and the 417 
patient going into asystole is necessary if the organs are to be of suitable quality to donate); the other 418 
case had not gone as planned and donation did not go ahead. Interestingly, these cases were not 419 
something that Emily and John discussed in detail, due to potential sensitivities over the programme 420 
having only just been implemented and their first potential DCD cases not having been successful. This 421 
lack of transparency around the actual practice of DCD at Hillview is more telling than frustrating. It 422 
reflects the ‘silencing’ of certain stories about organ donation (Jensen, 2011; Sharp, 2006) which have 423 
the potential to “undermine” the “fragile system” of transplantation, reliant, as it is, on the public 424 
willingness to donate (Jensen, 2017: 121-122). In this case, these non-stories highlight the fact that 425 
DCD is not only locally constructed as an ethical issue for patients, families, health professionals and 426 
hospital Trusts. Ethics in DCD extends wider, into understandings around what kind of information 427 
about the practice of DCD is deemed (ethically) acceptable for public consumption, in the context of 428 
a perceived organ shortage and the reintroduction of DCD as a way of tackling the ever-growing 429 
demand for organs.  430 
Discussion and conclusion 431 
The current focus by transplant policy-makers and bioethicists relate the ethics of DCD to sets of 432 
abstract principles, which are understood as being relevant for the practice of DCD. For example, the 433 
principle of ‘overall benefit’ is represented as the benchmark for practitioners, in their task of making 434 
(ethical) decisions about  intervening in the care of dying patients for the purposes of organ donation. 435 
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In other words the notion of what constitutes ethics in DCD and how DCD should be ethically practiced 436 
has been drawn in stone by official discourse.  437 
Whilst I am not disputing the importance of delineating what is, and is not, acceptable for clinical 438 
practice in matters around end-of-life care and organ donation, the findings presented here show that 439 
ethics in DCD are not abstracted moral issues, but present as emergent  practical problems, which are 440 
deeply embedded within specific organisational settings. In the context of Hillview, general concerns 441 
around DCD – such as the legalities of withdrawing treatment and proceeding with organ donation –  442 
interacted with more concrete practicalities and fears in relation to historical practices and existing 443 
institutional culture around organ donation at the Trust. Following Lynch (2013), the ethics of DCD are 444 
therefore encountered and constructed as particular sets of problems which cannot be disentangled 445 
from the institutional (historical, practical, and political) milieu in which they emerge. 446 
Moreover, the data from this case was documented prior to the production of the Ethical Framework 447 
for DCD (2011), and at a time when the legal parameters for the practice had only just been published 448 
(DH, 2009 guidelines). As such, staff at Hillview could be considered ‘moral pioneers’ (Rapp, 2000: 449 
307), in that they first had to create the conditions to make DCD functionally possible at the Trust, as 450 
well as define and work through conceivable predicaments of DCD as they were encountered. As we 451 
saw in the case presented, concerns expressed around DCD were novel and often pragmatically 452 
orientated around the steps that were necessary to convert a potential DCD donor into reality. Notions 453 
of what were potentially at stake in DCD went far beyond the abstracted bioethical principles such as 454 
‘overall benefit’, as laid out in the guidelines, and included understandings of: the potential for DCD 455 
to reduce local transplant waiting lists; the reputation of the hospital Trust and their staff, alongside 456 
public perceptions of organ donation; the welfare and actions of potential donor families; and changes 457 
to the everyday work of health professionals caring for dying patients. In turn, the process of working-458 
through these locally situated concerns around DCD involved animating procedures into acceptable 459 
forms of practice for the everyday environments in which DCD would be realised and donor organs 460 
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materialised. The ethics of DCD are not, therefore, something which can be wholly pre-defined outside 461 
of the contexts in which they are implemented. Instead, ethics in DCD need to be also understood in 462 
relation to how concerns about the process are organisationally and practically composed and, in turn, 463 
are dealt with in situ. 464 
In documenting the emergent, practically situated ethics of DCD, this paper adds to the growing body 465 
of social science research which examines the contexts in which controversies in science and medicine 466 
emerge and are managed (e.g. Hoeyer, 2005; Sperling, 2008), and the (co-) productive relationship 467 
between ethical norms and their application within medical and scientific settings (e.g. Brosnan et al., 468 
2013; Hoeyer & Tutton, 2005; Smith Doerr & Vardi, 2015). The findings presented here have 469 
demonstrated the ways in which ethics are assembled and dealt with as distinct sets of practical-470 
organisational problems, thus highlighting the importance of an institutionally-nuanced analysis for 471 
understanding both the composition and management of bioethical controversies, such as that of 472 
DCD.  473 
Whilst the study did not directly observe the clinical management of potential DCD donors, an analysis 474 
of the development of a DCD programme has demonstrated the importance of not making 475 
assumptions about the character of ethics in relation to DCD. Indeed, if we are to more fully 476 
understand what is at stake in the re-introduction of this original form of organ donation – for health 477 
professionals, patients and the public writ large – it is key that we do now turn to the study of DCD in 478 
practice, to examine what occurs when a potential DCD donor is identified and clinically managed for 479 
the purpose of organ donation. Having this type of situated focus on ethics is also of utmost 480 
importance given the proliferation of new techniques to increase the scope for obtaining organs from 481 
the deceased. Such interventions include: the use of ‘suboptimal’ organs from older donors, who 482 
would have previously been considered less than ideal candidates to donate (Callaghan et al., 2014); 483 
trials of novel procedures for preserving and resuscitating ‘higher-risk’ donor organs (Hosgood, Saeb-484 
Parsy, Hamed & Nicholson, 2016); and testing protocols for uncontrolled DCD in the UK  (Ortega-485 
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Deballon, Hornby & Shemie, 2015). It is only through the study of these technologies in situ that we 486 
will be able to more fully consider and intervene in the issues at play in relation to the seemingly 487 
endless array of interventions to obtain organs at the end of life. 488 
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